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the factual situation, there is, at least, an argument that a
trust could not have been impressed upon the insurance
proceeds. If the beneficiaries of the insurance policy have
no knowledge that they are to take the proceeds of said
policy in trust prior to the insured's death, there would
seem to be little ground upon which it could be argued
that they impliedly consented to hold the proceeds under
such condition before their right to the proceeds became
vested.
The Washington Supreme Court in an opinion arising
from facts closely analogous to those presented by the instant case distinguished the Burgess decision 43 in a similar
manner.4 However, it was there decided that the Court
did not have to determine whether a positive direction in
the will of the insured to apply insurance proceeds in a
particular manner would be enforceable, when the beneficiary had no knowledge of this direction prior to the insured's death; there being no positive direction to the
beneficiary, only precatory words, which were not considered to have had mandatory force. The decision in the instant case, therefore, apparently goes beyond the authorities cited by the Court.
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Survival As An Implied Condition In A Contingent Gift
To A Class -

The Demill Rule Revisited

Second Bank-State Street Trust Company v. Weston'
Testatrix, a domiciliary of Maryland, gave the residue
of her estate in trust to her three daughters for life, and
upon the death of the last of the three daughters to die,
the trust fund was to be distributed among the issue of
the testatrix's daughters per stirpes, but in the event of
the death of all three daughters "leaving no issue surviving
them," the trust fund was to go to the testatrix's "heirs at
law." Subsequent to testatrix's death in 1911 all three
daughters died without surviving issue. At the death in
1958 of the last surviving daughter a problem arose as
was not a part of the residue and remainder, but that it would be used
under the testaitor's wishes. Id., 580.
"Burgess v. Murray, 194 F. 2d 131 (5th Cir. 1952).
,In Re Milton's Estate, 48 Wash. 2d 389, 294 P. 2d 412 (1956).
Mass
M... ...

,

174 N.E. 2d 763 (1961).
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to the proper construction of the alternative remainder
gift to the "heirs at law." The question presented was
whether the heirs were to be determined as of the testatrix's death in 1911 or as of the death of the last surviving
life tenant in 1958.
Applying Maryland law, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts concluded that the rule of Demill v.
Reid2 was controlling and, consequently, distribution was
decreed to the heirs at law of the testatrix determined as
of 1958. The Court, in referring to the Demill case as "an
obscure and confusing decision,"'3 commented that the
Maryland Court of Appeals, in recent years, has made substantial efforts to avoid application of the doctrine first
announced therein, and that there are "indications that the
rule may eventually be wholly disregarded or abandoned,'
but nevertheless decided it remains the existing rule in
Maryland.
The rule declared in the Demill case is that "[w]here
there is an ultimate limitation upon a contingency to a
class of persons plainly described, and there are persons
answering the description in esse when the contingency
happens, they alone can take." 5 Stated another way and
as applied in the instant case, the rule is that where there
is a contingent remainder to a person or a class and an
alternative contingent remainder to a class, in the event
that the first remainder fails, the members of the class
taking the alternative remainder will be determined as of
the time of the failure of the first remainder, i.e., an
implied condition precedent of survivorship to the happening of the contingency will be raised. The effect of the rule
is that the class of takers does not open until the happening of the contingency upon which the first remainder is
limited, and then it closes immediately with the gift vesting in those members who have survived to that point. If
possible takers were in being at the time the alternative
contingent remainders 5a were created, but failed to survive
to the occurrence of the contingency, their heirs take nothing through them and are cut off. Only those persons
answering the class description who survive to the happening of the contingency will be held to have had a trans271 Md. 175, 17 A. 1014 (1889).

3 Supra, n. 1, 767.
4Supra,
n. 1, 769.
Supra, n. 2, 191.
5 Sometimes called contingent remainders with a double aspect.
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missible interest between the time of testator's death and
the time of vesting in possession.'
The Demill rule is a rule of construction only. 7 As
with all rules of construction, it has binding force only
when the testator has failed to clearly indicate in his will
the time at which class members of the alternative contingent remainder are to be determined. The intent of
the testator remains supreme." As expressed by Judge
Delaplaine in Chism v. Reese:9
"The cardinal rule for testamentary construction
is that the intention of the testator must be gathered
from the language of the entire will, particularly from
the clause in dispute, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances at the time the will was made. The
intention of the testator will be carried out whenever
it can be done without violence to the language employed, unless it conflicts with some established rule
of law."'"
Since in the instant case testatrix used the term "heirs
at law" without qualification by limiting words sufficient
to indicate her intent as to the time of determination of
the heirs," e.g., "to my then heirs at law," or "to my surviving heirs at law," the Court felt constrained to give
full force and effect to the rule first announced in the
Demill case.
The rule of the Demill case has been severely criticized
over the years. 12 Critics have questioned the propriety
of a court superimposing a second contingency, i.e., implied
survivorship to the happening of the contingency, where
6Reno,Alienability and Transmissibility of FutureInterests in Maryland.
2 Md. L. Rev. 89, 116 (1938) ; Reno, Further Developments as to the Alien-

ability and Transmissibility of Future Interests in Maryland, 15 Md. L.
Rev. 193, 212 (1955).
'Boynton v. Barton, 192 Md. 582, 588-592, 64 A. 2d 750 (1949) ; Carter,

Recent Developments Relating to Devolution and Descent of Future Interests in Maryland, 11 Md. L. Rev. 187, 213-220 (1950) ; Reno, supra,
n. 6. 1955 article, pp. 219-220.
"Grace v. Thompson, 169 Md. 653, 658, 182 A. 573 (1936).
0 90 Md. 311, 316, 58 A. 2d 643 (1948).
10To the same effect: Marty v. First Nat'l. Bk. of 'Balto., 209 Md. 210,
120 A. 2d 841 (1956); Jones v. Holloway, 183 Md. 40, 36 A. 2d 551. 152
A.L.R. 933 (1944) ; Robinson v. Mercantile Trust Co.. 180 Md. 336, 24 A.
2d 299, 138 A.L.R. 1427 (1942) ; tGent v. Kelbaugh, 179 Md. 343, 18 A. 2d
595 (1941) ; Grace v. Thompson. supra. n. 8. 657-658: Hutton v. Safe Dep.
& Trust Co., 150 Md. 539, 554, 133 A. 308 (1926) ; West v. Sellmayer, 150
Md. 478, 133 A. 333 (1926).
Boynton v. Barton, 192 Md. 582, 64 A. 2d 750 (1949).
123 POWELL, RFAL PROPErTY (1952) 223: Reno. supra, n. 6 (1938 art.)
117-118; Reno, supra, n. 6 (1955 art.) 214-216, Note, Implication of Sur-

vivorslip in Contingent Gifts to a Class, 9 Md. L. Rev. 367 (1948).
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the creator only imposed one, i.e., that the substitutional
gift to a class will take effect only if the primary gift fails."
MILLER has pointed out that the result of the rule sometimes is that children of deceased children are excluded
from their parent's share, "an unfortunate result, based
upon a very technical rule."' 4 When one considers that
normally the objects of a testator's bounty are those persons he knows and that, by using a group designation, he
has indicated his intent to benefit as many as possible, it
seems questionable to limit the ultimate takers to those
members of the class in being at the happening of the
contingency, rather than to allow both those class members in existence at testator's death as well as afterborn
members to share. POWELL, in referring to the rule, has
stated that "no satisfactory independent rationale for it
has been discovered."' 5 The only arguments presented in
favor of the rule are that "it is not to be supposed that
the testator intended that the members of the class should
be fixed before it is determined that there is to be a
bequest,"'" and that where a gift to primary remaindermen is conditioned on survival, it is unlikely that the
testator would intend the
secondary takers to be deter7
mined without survival.'
Despite frequently expressed doubts as to the desirability of the Demill doctrine, many jurisdictions still support it,'" while others have refused to do so. 9 Had the
present case been decided under Massachusetts rather than
Maryland law, the result would most likely have been
different, as Massachusetts is considered among those states
Is Note,

id., 372 ff.
14MIEa, CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS (1927) § 237, p. 676, n. 4.
1POWELL, supra, n. 12.
16In re Savela's Estate, 138 Minn. 93, 163 N.W. 1029, 1030 (1917).
17In re Power's Will, 210 N.Y.S. 2d 639, 27 Misc. 2d 179 (1960) ; In re
Wiltsie's Will, 203 N.Y.S. 2d 298, 24 Misc. 2d 398 (1960) ; In re Sayre's
Will, 1 A.D. 2d 475, 151 N.Y.S. 2d 506 (1956).
IsEvans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 190 Md. 332, 58 A. 2d 649 (1948);
Cowman v. Classen, 156 Md. 428, 144 A. 367 (1929) ; Schapiro v. Howard,
113 Md. 360, 78 A. 58 (1910) ; In re Schmidt's Will, 256 Minn. 64, 97 N.W.
2d 441 (1959) ; Coley v. Lowen, 357 Mo. 762, 211 S.W. 2d 18 (1948) ; In re
Maxwell's Will, 28 Misc. 2d 913, 213 N.Y.S. 2d 415 (1961) ; In re Waessel's
Will, 27 Misc. 2d 694, 210 N.Y.S. 2d 647 (1960) ; Jones v. Holland, 223 S.C.
500, 77 S.E. 2d 202 (1953).
"Cox v. Danehower, 211 Ark. 696, 202 S.W. 2d 200 (1947) ; Kimberly v.
New Haven Bank N.B.A., 144 Conn. 107, 127 A. 2d 817, 821 (1956) ; Close
v. Benham. 97 Conn. 102, 115 A. 626 (1921); Beckley v. Leffingwell. 57
Conn. 163, 17 A. 766 (1889) ; LeSourd v. Leinweber, 412 Ill. 100, 105 N.E. 2d
722 (1952) ; Himmel v. Himmel, 294 Ill.
557, 128 N.E. 641 (1920) ; Wilson
v. Miller, 25 N.J. Super. 280, 96 A. 2d 283 (1953); Tuttle v. Woolworth,
62 N.J. Eq. 532, 50 A. 445 (1901) ; Davis v. Lynchburg National Bank &
Trust Company, 198 Va. 14, 92 S.E. 2d 278 (1956).
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which refuse to imply a condition precedent of survivorship unless the testator had indicated he so desired the
imposition of this additional contingency. 0
States which refuse to apply the Demill rule often apply
21
in its stead the rule of the RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY.
Section 261 provides that:
"In the limitation purporting to create a remainder,
or an executory interest, the presence of a condition
precedent, or of a defeasibility, dependent on other
facts is not a material factor in determining the existence of the requirement of survival to the time of
the fulfillment or elimination
of such other condition
22
precedent or defeasibility."
To the same effect is Section 296 (2):
"From the fact that a class can increase in membership until a certain future date, no inference should
be made that only such members of the class as survive
to such future date become distributees."
Section 308, stating the approach which an increasing
number of courts have adopted,23 provides:
"When a limitation is in favor of the 'heirs,' 'heirs
of the body,' 'next of kin' or 'relatives' of a designated
person, or in favor of other groups described by words
of similar import, and the persons who come within
the term employed to describe the conveyees are to
be determined by a statute governing the intestate
succession of property, then the statute is applied as
of the death of the designated ancestor, unless an intent of the conveyor to have the statute applied as of
some other date 2is4 found from additional language
or circumstances.

Second Bank-State Street Trust Company v. Weston,
N.E. 2d 763, 767 (1961).
11RESTATEMENT. PROPERTY (1940)
2

...

Mass ...

, 174

§§ 261, 292(2), 308.

Comment to § 261:
"The rule stated in this Section would be almost too obvious for
statement, if it were not for the erroneous view, often expressed in
cases concerning class gifts, that the members of the class necessarily
remain subject to the condition precedent of survival so long as the
ultimate ascertainment of the class is postponed by another defeasibility or condition precedent [of survivorship] ....
3Sitpra. n. 19.

4 For discussion, see: 57 Am. Jur. 846, WILLS, § 1279; American Law of
Property (1952) § 22.60, pp. 434-435; 3 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY (1952)
§§ 372, 375; SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1956), § 734.
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In essence, the view adopted by the RESTATEMENT is that
survival is a question of construction in all types of gifts,
rather than an implied condition precedent in an alternative gift to a class. If the RESTATEMENT does not directly
deny the rule as to alternative remainders in Demill v.
Reid, it seems to do so by implication.2 5 Had the RESTATEmmT rule2 6 been applied to the present case, those persons answering the class description of testatrix's "heirs"
at the time of her death in 1911 would have comprised the
class of takers at the happening of the contingency, i.e.,
death of all daughters without surviving issue, since the
testatrix did not indicate any intent to limit the takers
only to those possible class members who survived to the
time of distribution in 1958.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, while not expressly
repudiating the Demill doctrine, nevertheless has gone to
great lengths to avoid its application in cases where the
result of applying the rule would have been an apparently
unsatisfactory distribution in the eyes of the testator. It
must be remembered that the rule is applied only to alternative contingent gifts to a class; it does not apply to an
alternative contingent gift to designated individuals, i.e.,
where the person to take is certain. It is well settled in
Maryland that all contingent estates of inheritance in an
individual are transmissible by descent, and are devisable
and assignable.27 Therefore, whenever the Court of Appeals
has been able to construe an alternative contingent remainder clause as not referring to a class gift in the sense
of Maryland's accepted definition of a class gift, i.e., predicated on the intention of the testator to make a gift to "a
body of persons uncertain in number at the time of the
gift, to be ascertained at a future date," but rather as referring to designated individuals, the rule of the Demill
case has been held inapplicable and survivorship to the
time of the happening of the contingency is not implied. 28
27,Evans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.. 190 Md. 332, 339, 58 A. 2d 649 (1948).
2 Supra, ns. 21-22.
Massachusetts has adopted the RESTATEMENT rule;
Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company v. Northey, 335 Mass. 201, 138
N.E. 2d 613 (1956).
VMcClurg v. Myers, 129 Md. 112, 121, 98 A. 491 (1916) ; Fisher v.
Wagner, 109 Md. 243, 249, 71 A. 999 (1909); Buck v. Lantz, 49 Md. 439
(1878) ; Snively v. Beavans, 1 Md. 208 (1851) ; MILLER, CONSTRUCTION OF
WILLS (1927) § 233; Reno, Alienability and Transmissibility of Future
Interests In Maryland. 2 Md. L. Rev. 89, 114, 116 (1938) ; Reno, Further

Developments as to the Alienability and Transmissibility of Future In-

terests in Maryland, 15 Md. L. Rev. 193, 214 (1955).
28Davis v. Mercantile Trust Co., 206 Md. 278, 111 A. 2d 602 (1955);
Boynton v. Barton, 192 Md. 582, 590, 64 A. 2d 750 (1949) ; Chism v. Reese,
190 Md. 311, 58 A. 2d 643 (1948) ; Stahl v. Emery, 147 Md. 123, 126, 127 A.
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In Hammond v. Piper the alternative contingent remainder to testator's "other children" was construed as
referring specifically to those children previously mentioned in the will, rather than to a class. The clause "to
revert" to the testator's "grandchildren, the issue of my
sons Charles ...

and Francis" was held in Chism v. Reese

°

to mean to return to designated persons, and not to go to
a future class. By thus avoiding the Demill requirement
of a class gift, Maryland has permitted the children, issue,
etc., of deceased class members to take their ancestor's
share, thus more closely approximating the average testator's desire to distribute his property to the people he
knows rather than only to those who survive to a future
time. However, by terming the disputed clause a gift to
individuals rather than to a class, only those persons designated, irrespective of whether they survive to a future
time or not, will be permitted to share. Therefore, all afterborn persons will be cut off, even though they too would
seemingly have been encompassed in the testator's thoughts
when he used words which commonly indicate a class, i.e.,
children, issue, etc.
Of the three possible constructions: (1) applying the
Demill rule and permitting only those members of the
class who survive to the happening of the contingency to
share, (2) applying the RESTATEMENT rule and permitting
all members of the class who are alive at testator's death
as well as all afterborn members to take in the absence
of a contrary intent by testator, and (3) seizing on particular words in order to convert what is ostensibly a class
gift into a gift to designated individuals, and then permitting only those designated persons to share, regardless
of survivorship, the RESTATEMENT view seems to more
reasonably reflect what the average testator would have
in mind. It fulfills the usual desires of a testator when he
makes a gift to what is commonly thought of as a class
by distributing the property both to those people whom
he knew as well as benefiting the entire membership of
the group designated. The Demill rule, by permitting only
a limited group of possible class members to take, dismally fails in carrying out either of the aforementioned
intentions of an ordinary testator who makes a gift to a
class. The approach of more recent Maryland decisions,
760 (1925); MILLER, CONSTRUCTON OF WILLS (1927)
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

(1940)

§ 67, pp. 185, 187;

§ 279, p. 1445; 61 A.L.R. 2d 212 (1958),

a thorough discussion of what constitutes a gift to a class.
185 Md. 314, 318-319, 44 A. 2d 756 (1945).
" Supra, n. 28.
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as evidenced in the Hammond and Chism cases, in seizing
upon particular words to convert what seems to have been
intended as class gifts into gifts to individuals, while
satisfying a testator's common desire to distribute his
property to those people he knows, fails to satisfy the
second desire usually present when he makes a "class-like"
gift, i.e., to benefit as many members of the class as possible
namely the afterborn.
The Hammond and Chism approach has certainly
stripped the Demill rule of much of its vitality. The rule
itself has not been applied vigorously in this state, as
evidenced by Judge Henderson's comment in Boynton v.
Barton:
"Though Demill v. Reid has frequently been cited by
this court, the result in that case has seldom been
reached in subsequent cases."'"
Despite the inroads on the doctrine of the Demill case
made by the Hammond and Chism decisions, the Court in
Evans v. Safe Deposit and Trust32 refused to hold that it
had been modified or changed and applied it to an alternative contingent remainder to "children" of the grantor, "the
child or children of any deceased child . . .to take and
have the part or share to which the parent, if living, would
have been entitled." It is noteworthy, however, that under
the facts of the Evans case, the ultimate course of descent
was to the same persons who would have taken had
Demill not been followed. Although taking cognizance of
the shift away from the Demill rule, at least in emphasis,
the Massachusetts Court in the principal case concluded
that "It cannot now be said, however, in view of Evans v.
Safe Deposit and Trust Company, . . . that the rule no
longer exists. 2' 3 It is also of interest that Justice Cutter,
in writing the Massachusetts opinion, impliedly cautioned
all Maryland lawyers with the following comment:
"The parties have presented to us a question of interpretation of somewhat conflicting decisions of a court
of last resort of a sister State. We cannot predict what
treatment the Maryland court will give to the Demill
rule when next confronted with its application."3 4
MORTON
-192 Md. 582, 590, 64 A. 2d 750 (1949).
2190
Md. 332, 58 A. 2d 649 (1948).
... Mass. ... , 174 N.E. 2d 767, 769 (1961).
" Ibid.
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